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Abstract. This section discusses the need for regulation of international 
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1 Introduction 
High international roaming charges have been a matter of concern in several 
countries. The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission concluded in 2005 
that both wholesale and retail roaming charges are too high, but have not turned into 
direct price regulation. The Arab Regulators’ Network is working on different models 
for introducing price regulation in the Arab region.  
Regulation of international roaming is more complicated than regulation of other 
telecom services for two reasons. First, the market structures on mobile markets are 
different than on markets for fixed services. Second, regulation of international 
roaming is difficult to implement at the national level as operators from more than 
one country are involved.  
Markets for fixed services are dominated by incumbent operators having their own 
fixed infrastructures. Regulatory intervention demanding open access to these 
networks will benefit new entrants and promote competition at least in the short term. 
In mobile markets the situation is a bit different as there are more mobile 
infrastructures on each market. It is therefore less obvious what market implications 
will be, if a similar kind of obligation is posed on mobile networks.  
Partly for these reasons, no regulatory intervention in international roaming 
charges within the EU area was made before a legislation addressing this specific 
issue was adopted in June 2007. Although it was recognized that the roaming issue 
included data as well as voice services, only voice was addressed in the first 
legislation. Roaming regulation of data was seen to be an even more complicated 
issue, which needed more analysis before action could be taken.  
According to the New Regulatory Framework (NRF), international roaming is 
defined as a separate market, but the national market studies prepared according the 
guidelines of NRF did not lead to price regulation in the EU member states. 
Regulation of this market seems to be more difficult to handle by national regulators 
than regulation of markets for other telecom services.  
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The legislation on regulation of international roaming made by the EU introduces 
price caps in both retail and wholesale markets for international roaming of voice 
services [10]. The major argument for such a heavy handed regulation is that 
international roaming prices hitherto have been way above cost based prices, and that 
roaming charges represent a major barrier towards growth in international mobile 
communication within the EU. The proposal resulted in a reduction in international 
roaming prices with more than 50%. The question is how this intervention will affect 
the market in the long term. Will a temporary price cap be enough to keep prices 
down or will it be necessary to introduce a more permanent type of regulation? 
Another question is if such regulation can be made without having a negative impact 
on competition and innovation.  
2 Techno-Economic Analysis of Roaming Costs 
This section will look at the demand and supply conditions on the roaming market 
from a techno-economic point of view, and discuss the how the current experiences 
on regulation of international roaming of voice services can be applied in the design 
of regulation of data roaming: 
• Mobile origination (MO)  
• Mobile/Fixed termination (MT/FT)  
• International Transit (IT)  
• Roaming specific costs (RSC)  
Mobile origination includes the cost of initiating the call and for connecting the 
caller’s mobile terminal with the core network. Mobile termination includes the cost 
related to bring the call from the receiver’s core network to his/hers mobile terminal. 
The international transit costs include the costs related to connect the callers and the 
receiver’s core networks. Roaming specific costs include costs directly related to the 
roaming transaction. This is the kind of costs, which are not included in a normal 
international call.  
The costs of mobile origination are comparable to those of mobile termination. For 
data services it may even be difficult to distinguish between origination and 
termination. For voice mobile termination rates are subject to regulation within the 
EU and are in principle cost-based. Mobile termination rates per minute varied in 
October 2007 before regulation was implemented between € 0.0206 in Cyprus and €  
0.1882 in Bulgaria. However in most countries the rates were close to the EU average 
of € 0.0967. The European average for local fixed termination is € 0.0083.  
International transit costs depend on the inter-operator tariffs agreed between 
operators. These tariffs are confidential, but the costs are far below the cost of 
origination and termination.  
3 Structure of the Market for Roaming Services 
The market for international for international roaming services differs in many ways 
from the markets for other mobile services. The special characteristics of this market 
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have been studied in a number of reports and research papers, e.g., [9]. A formal 
mathematical model of the market is presented in [8] and further extended [7]. The 
Commission has also created a model in their impact assessment report [1].  
3.1 Demand Conditions – Retail 
According to the impact assessment report international roaming is used by at least 
147 million EU citizens, of whom 110 million are business customers, while 37 
million are travelling for leisure purposes [1].  
Although international roaming is an important service used by a large group of 
customers, most subscribers use this service only occasionally, and the level of 
roaming charges are relatively unimportant for the total cost paid by a mobile 
subscriber. Therefore only few subscribers will let their choice of operator depend on 
the roaming charges offered.  
Another characteristic of roaming services is that it involves use of many different 
visiting networks, so even high volume users may only gain a minor benefit by 
reductions in wholesale roaming charges by a particular operator.  
An alternative to international roaming is to acquire a local SIM-card and in this way 
to avoid paying roaming charges. This solution is in particular attractive for placing local 
calls abroad, and is used by many potential high volume users of international roaming.  
Even though the level of roaming charges is not used as a parameter in 
competition, it might still be a price elastic service. According to a European 
fieldwork on roaming prepared in 2006, the main reason for using the mobile phone 
less while travelling abroad is excessive costs, and six out of ten Europeans would use 
their phone abroad if prices were more attractive [3].  
The impact assessment report assumes in its analysis price elasticity between -0.55 
and -1.20 [1]. If this is correct, there will be substantial welfare gains associated with 
price reductions towards costs based prices (If elasticity are -1.20, even operators 
revenue will increase).  
It should however be noted that the majority of the subscribers using international 
roaming are business customers, which are likely to be less price sensitive than private 
customers. Another factor, which may lead to low price sensitivity is lack of 
transparency. If users are unaware of the actual prices, price reductions will not lead to a 
higher demand. Use of SMS informing about roaming charges sent to subscriber arriving 
in country makes the prices more transparent and may therefore increase price elasticity.  
International roaming is an international service. International roaming is demanded 
by customers, when they are abroad. The demand for roaming in a certain area depends 
therefore not on the number of local customers, but on the number of visitors. Roaming 
may therefore constitute a major share of the traffic and revenue in tourist areas.  
3.2 Supply Conditions – Retail 
Suppliers at the retail market include all mobile operators at the national market. As with 
most other telecom services, the retail market is more competitive than the wholesale 
market as it includes network operators as well as virtual operators and service providers. 
Although the suppliers are identical to those offering other mobile services, the market 
seems to be less competitive. At least the mark-ups demanded by the operators are much 
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higher than mark-ups on other mobile services. The reasons for this is that international 
roaming is bundled with the subscription for domestic mobile services (unless the 
customer buys a new SIM-card), are that customers consider roaming rates to be of 
minor importance compared to rates for other services.  
3.3 Demand Conditions – Wholesale 
International roaming services are demanded by most mobile operators from their 
retail customers. Only few operators with an international footprint are able to handle 
part of their roaming within their own network, while others other – including virtual 
network operators – will need to buy roaming services from local mobile operators.  
Operators will charge their retail customers a price covering the wholesale roaming 
costs plus a mark-up covering various retail costs such as billing and customer 
handling. The incentive to reduce wholesale costs depends on how price sensitive the 
retail customers are. In addition, for technical reasons, it is not always possible for the 
home mobile network operator (HMNO) to choose the visiting mobile network 
operator (VMNO) offering the lowest price.  
3.4 Supply Conditions – Wholesale 
Non-roaming international mobile calls can be handled within the same framework as 
fixed international calls. Before the liberalization, international fixed calls were priced 
according to the international accounting rates. The system with international 
accounting rates dates back to 1865, when the predecessor of the International 
Telecom Union (ITU) was created. The rate determines how much an operator in one 
country needs to pay for termination of a call in another country. These rates are 
negotiated on a bilateral basis and are loosely connected to the costs of maintaining 
end-to end facilities between the two countries [6].  
Payments of international roaming calls are organized in a similar way as other 
international calls: The call is handled by the operator, where the call is originated. If 
this involves use of services from other operators, these operators are paid wholesale 
charges by the originating operator.  
In international roaming the call is originated in a visited network and the visited 
network operator (VMNO) will therefore charge the home network operator 
(HMNO), holding the subscription of the caller, in order to cover its costs. This 
payment is settled through the Transferred Accounting Procedure (TAP) by use of 
Inter Operator Tariffs (IOT) [5].  
For receiving international roaming call, the situation is slightly different. Here, the 
caller will pay for the price for termination of the call in the home network of the 
roaming subscriber. The HMNO will then transfer the call to the VMNO, who will 
receive the usual mobile termination rate for terminating the call. In addition to this, 
the HMNO must pay the international transit charge for a call. Thus the IOTs used for 
originating roaming calls are not used in this case.  
The number of suppliers of roaming services is the same as the suppliers of 
wholesale mobile services in the respective countries. In most countries all mobile 
network operators are required to provide roaming services to foreign operators. Thus 
the number suppliers is 3-4 in most of the EU countries, and it could be expected that 
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the level of competition on roaming services should be at a level similar to that for 
wholesale provision of other mobile services.  
However, IOT have not followed the same decreasing price trends as wholesale 
charges for other mobile services. Up to 1998 IOTs were based on normal network 
tariffs for local call with a mark-up at 15% [8]. But since then local tariffs have 
declined due to price competition. IOTs have not been subject to the same kind of 
competition, operators within the same country use similar IOTs, and if they relate to 
normal network tariffs they are set according to the highest rates offered.  
There are a number of reasons for this:  
• Technical: Limitations in the choice of VMNO;  
• Tariffs are agreed on reciprocal basis; and 
• Demand conditions and lack of transparency.  
As noted above, it is not always possible for the HMNO to choose the VMNO with 
lowest IOT. This implies that suppliers of roaming services cannot gain market shares by 
reducing their roaming charges. Market shares of VMNOs are independent of their 
charges, and therefore, there is no incentive to lower charges as it just will decrease 
revenues.  
IOTs remind in many ways international accounting rates. Usually agreements are 
reciprocal in the sense that IOTs are independent on the direction of the call. In a 
market where competition is limited, the HMNO and the VMNO have a common 
interest in keeping IOT at a high level. The VMNO will get higher revenue for 
providing the roaming, the HMNO will able to transfer the roaming costs to its retail 
customers, and will therefore not suffer from this. When a roaming call is made in the 
opposite direction it is the other operator who benefits.  
The international accounting rates contributed to keep international telephone 
charges at an artificial high level for many years, and prices came down only when it 
became possible for retail customers to choose an alternative international operator 
offering lower charges.  
The final point to mention is the impact demand conditions and lack of 
transparency. In elastic demand caused by lack of market transparency as well as 
other factors implies that suppliers are less eager to reduce costs. For instance there is 
no incentive to solve the technical complications related to choosing the cheapest 
VMNO, if cost reductions don’t lead to increased traffic demand.  
4 EU Regulation of International Roaming Charges 
The EU regulation includes regulation of wholesale as well as retail charges. The first 
proposal from the Commission linked the prices paid for international roaming to 
prices paid by customers for ordinary mobile calls in their home country [2]. This 
home pricing principle was replaced by a “European Home Market Approach” in the 
revised proposal, in which the same maximum price limits are applied in all the EU 
member states. In the final proposal adopted by the Parliament, the concept of a 
Eurotariff is used for the maximum price that operators are allowed to charges their 
customers for international roaming calls within the EU area. The Europe-wide 
maximum tariffs are defined both for wholesale and retail charges.  
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Table 1. Eurotariff maximum price while abroad (€-cents per minute) [4] 






Summer 2009 43 19 11 Free 
Summer 2010 39 15 11 Free 
Summer 2011 35 11 11 Free 
For data services regulation was introduced 1 July 2009. This regulation limits the 
price for sending a text message while abroad at €0.11. Receiving an SMS in another EU 
country will remain free of charge. The cost of surfing the web and downloading movies 
or video programs with a mobile phone while abroad by introducing a maximum 
wholesale cap of €1 per megabyte downloaded. This limit will be decreased each year. In 
addition consumers are protected from “bill shocks” by introduction of a cut-off 
mechanism once the bill reaches €50, unless they choose another cut-off limit.  
5 Discussion 
Regulation of international roaming is more complicated than regulation of other 
telecom services for two reasons. First the market structures on mobile markets are 
different than on markets for fixed services. Markets for fixed services are dominated 
by one incumbent operator on each market who has its own fixed infrastructure. 
Regulatory intervention demanding open access to this network will benefit new 
entrants and promote competition at least in the short term. In mobile markets, the 
situation is slightly different as more competing mobile infrastructures are available. 
It is therefore less obvious what the market implications will be, if a similar kind of 
obligation is imposed on mobile networks. Second, regulation of international 
roaming is difficult to implement at national level as operators from more than one 
country are involved.  
For these reasons, a common framework for regulation was not adopted at EU 
level before 2007. International roaming was defined as a separate market in the 
market definitions applied in the EU regulatory framework, but the implementation of 
the new telecom regulation package has not led to any intervention on this market at 
national level. Market studies for this particular market were among the last to be 
implemented. In August 2006 market analyses for other telecom services had more or 
less been completed in most countries, but only Finland had made a decision on 
international roaming; here the conclusion was that the market was competitive. Since 
then, no other member states have decided to intervene at the market for international 
roaming. Regulation of the market for international roaming seems to be more 
difficult for national regulators to handle than regulation of markets for other telecom 
services.  
The proposal for regulation of international roaming put forward by the EU 
Commission suggested the introduction of price caps in both retail and wholesale 
markets for international roaming. The major argument for such heavy-handed  
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regulation was that international roaming prices were much higher than cost-based 
prices, and that roaming charges represented a major barrier towards growth in 
international mobile communication within the EU.   
An interesting aspect of the proposal from the Commission is the use of a 
European home-market approach, which implies use of common price caps for all EU 
member states. This implies that determination of price caps are moved from national 
to European level. This may therefore be seen as a step towards decreasing the power 
of national telecom authorities and strengthening regulation at EU level. A common 
price cap improves transparency for consumers, but it may create a situation where 
operators in high cost countries may have difficulties in covering their costs in full. It 
may also create strange pricing schemes, where international roaming becomes 
cheaper than national roaming.  
Both wholesale charges and retail charges have been subject to intensive debate. 
From the beginning operators were very much against any form of regulation, in 
particular at the retail level. In spite of amble documentation proving excessive rates 
without any relationship to costs, it is claimed that there is effective competition on 
the international roaming market.  
Also some Governments have been very reluctant towards regulation. In particular 
in tourist destinations in Southern Europe, international roaming has proved to be an 
important source of income.  
The EU intervention is a compromise between those asking for cost based roaming 
charges and the interests of operators – particular those operating in major tourist 
destinations. Nevertheless seen from the consumers’ point of view, it is a considerable 
improvement compared to the former situation, and it was implemented with an 
impressive speed (less than one year after the proposal from the Commission was 
published). It is also a move away from regulation based on more or less objective 
economic evidence towards regulation based on political negotiations between parties 
with conflicting interests.  
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